lagging rates of productivity growth, non-competitive product quality in key industries, structural inflexibilities, and declining real wage levels and flat family earnings (Carnavale, 1991) . Further, they offer a plethora of proposed solutions covering both broad public policies and more specific firm-level policies and practices.
The latter often call upon organizations to do a better job of developing and utilizing their human resources (Cyert and Mowery, 1986; Marshall, 1987; Walton, 1987; Dertouzos, Solow, and Lester, 1989) . Newly industrializing economies such as Mexico, Brazil, and some of the Asian countries compete in world markets with wages that range from 10 to 30 percent of those paid in more advanced countries such as Japan, Germany, and the U.S.
For companies in the more advanced countries to compete in world markets without lowering wages and living standards requires not only everincreasing levels of productivity, but also finding other sources of competitive advantage such as high product quality, product differentiation, innovation, and speed to market.
But, competing on these grounds often requires major organizational transformations in human resource policies and practices.
This is especially the case for U.S. firms that have grown up under the legacy of scientific management and industrial engineering principles that emphasize the separation of decisionmaking from doing and narrow divisions of labor and functional specialization. It is also true for unionized firms that have long done business under the New Deal model of labor relations that emphasizes job control unionism and the separation of managerial prerogatives from worker and union rights.
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in human resource management and the growth of a number of new academic journals, professional societies, and industry-university research and educational partnerships. All of these share the view that human resource issues should and, given the increased awareness of their importance, would be elevated to new levels of influence within corporate decision-making and national policy making.
In the u.s. these expectations and arguments have been voiced before, in some cases way before (Slichter, 1919; Douglas, 1919) . Nonetheless, even today we find that the human resource function within many American corporations remains weak and relatively low in influence relative to other managerial functions such as finance, marketing, and manufacturing (Kochan and osterman, 1991 (Dyer and Holder, 1988) .
Thus, we see the need to bring labor and government back into our theories and models of human resource management policy and practice.
To do this we need to integrate recent works from human resource management with research from industrial relations, political economy, and internal labor markets.
We now turn to this task.
GENERIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL COMMITMENT FIRMS
Many terms have been used to describe firms that seek to treat human resources as a source of competitive advantage and to do so in a manner that preserves high standards of living: "high commitment" (Walton, 1985) , "excellent" (Peters and Waterman, 1982) , "best practice" (Dertouzos, et aI, 1988) , "transformed" (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986) , and "high commitment" (Lawler, 1986) . We will use the term "mutual commitment" (Walton, 1985) .
We prefer this term since, as will be evident below, we believe 5 that achieving and sustaining this approach requires the strong support of multiple stakeholders in an organization and in the broader economy and society in which the organization is embedded. Figure 1 summarizes a set of generic principles that characterize the "mutual commitment" approach.
It is important to realize that these are broad principles which are operationalized in quite different forms across countries and firms. Therefore, they do not translate into a universal set of "best practices", but rather stand as broad guidelines to be implemented in ways that conform to particular cultural or organizational realities.
Further, much work remains to be done to (l) test the validity of these principles, (2) Figure 1 organizes the principles according to the three tiered institutional framework presented in Kochan, et aI, {1986}. At the highest level of the firm, first, it is essential that business strategies not be built around low costs, and especially not around low wages, salaries, and benefit levels, but rather Finally, at the strategy and policy-making level it is necessary that there be one or more mechanisms for giving voice to employee and human resource interests in strategy formulation and organizational governance processes. One possibility is the use of planning mechanisms to assure that human resource issues receive just due in the formulation of business strategies (Dyer, 1983; Schuler and Jackson, 1987 (Dyer, Foltman, and Milkovich, 1985 A high conflict/low trust relationship (Fox, 1974) is seen as incompatible with the task of building and maintaining mutual commitment. This does not mean that all conflicts between employees and employers wi ther away.
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Indeed we continue to assume that conflicting interests are a natural part of the employment relationship, but that these conflicts cannot be so all-encompassing that they push out the potential for effective problem solving and negotiations.
Instead they must be resolved efficiently and in a fashion that maintains the parties' commitment and capacities for pursuing joint gains.
Obviously the above set of principles constitute a caricature of actual organizations. No organization is expected to meet all of these principles perfectly or through the same set of practices.
Nonetheless, in the broadest sense it is postulated that when these principles are properly operationalized they will come together in the form an integrated system that, other things equal, will produce globally competitive business results as well as globally competitive standards of living for employees.
The preceding principles were presented as if each firm has total discretion over the choice of its human resource strategies and as if each firm's choice is independent of the strategies followed by other firms. But, neither of these is accurate. It is probably fair to say 10 that very few organizations have yet embraced the full set of principles in a coherent fashion. But, clearly, the past decade has been a time of great experimentation with various of these principles to the point that it is probably fair to say that most large and perhaps even a majority of relatively small firms have experimented with one or more of them at one time or another.
SUPPORTIVE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.
We believe that one of the most powerful determinants and reinforcing forces for a mutual commitment human resources strategy lies in the nature of competitive business strategies. As a result imports are taking a greater share of the market both at the low price points where mass production continues to dominate and at the high price points where styling, fashion, and variability in tastes matter most.
In the U.S. airline industry, the low cost strategies of continental and Eastern Airlines served to limit the success of the high growth and service differentiation strategies of firms such as American and Delta Airlines in the first decade following industry deregulation (Kochan and McKersie, 1991) . Thus, while low cost strategies are difficult to sustain over the long run, especially when faced with competition from abroad, a significant number of American firms continue to give priority to this strategy and thereby slow the pace of innovations in human resource practices.
MANAGERIAL VALUES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.
As noted earlier, we continue to see top executive and line management support as a necessary condition for introducing and sustaining the types of human resource strategies described in Yet, there is little in the history of American management, or in the behavior of American management in the 1980s, to suggest that management alone, left to its own devices, will produce the transformations in organizational practices needed to sustain and diffuse the delineated human resource principles.
While some, perhaps even many, top executives share supportive values, they are buffeted by equally strong countervailing pressures that call for quick action taken to bolster the short term interests of major shareholders.
Consider, for example, the following description of the dominant managerial strategies of the 1980s offered by the top human resource executive at General Electric, one of the firms often cited as symbolizing exemplary management practices (Doyle, 1989 ):
Economic power in the Eighties--the power to launch and sustain the dynamic processes of restructuring and globalization--has been concentrated especially in the hands of the larger companies, along with the financiers and raiders who alternatively support or attack them. If the Eighties was a new Age of the Entrepreneur--and small business did in fact account for most of the new job creation in the united states--it was Corporate America that accounted for most of the economic disruption and competitive improvement; it took out people, layers and costs while rearranging portfolios and switching industries...Across the decade in the u.s. alone, there was over a trillion dollars of merger and acquisition and LBO activity.
Ten million manufacturing jobs were eliminated or shifted to the growing service sector. Deals were cut and alliances forged around America and around the world.
From where the shots were called was well-known. Restructuring and globalization did not emerge from employee suggestion boxes; they erupted from executive suites... So competitive rigor--imposed by companies in their employer roles and demonstrated by their restructuring and globalizing moves--was widely accepted because its rationale was widely understood.
Given this climate--along with a political environment of relative deregulation--companies in the Eighties could focus more on portfolios than on people; fire more than hire; invest more in machines than in skills.
The obvious reality of tough competitive facts inspired fear in employees and gave employers the power to act. Shuttered factories and fired neighbors is restructuring without subtlety: People could see the damage and feel the pain. This, then, is the perhaps the dominant political environment of corporate decision-making and governance that must be taken into account in building theoretical and action models in the human resource management arena. (Kochan, et aI, 1986) .
Some progress has been made in bringing human resource considerations into business strategy sessions through the integration of formal planning processes.
Exactly how much progress, however, is difficult to say.
Recent surveys suggest that at least some level of integration has been achieved by between 20 and 45 percent of medium-sized and large firms (Burack, 1986; Nkomo, 1986) .
More intensive case studies support these figures, but call into question the depth of the integration in many cases (Buller, 1988; Craft, 1988) .
Functionally, some progressive human resource departments are striving to adopt a so-called business partner role, which puts them in a position to interject human resource considerations in ongoing business decision-making (Dyer and Holder, 1988) .
But, again, while the trend is in the right direction, at this juncture the development is probably neither very widespread nor particularly deep.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.
Diffusion of the practices needed to demonstrate a commitment to employment continuity is particularly limited in the U.S. (Dyer, et aI, 1985) .
Massive layoffs became commonplace during the 1980s, affecting not only blue-collar and clerical employees, but also tradi tionally immune professional and managerial employees as well. Chrysler, for example, took this approach. in negotiating "Modern
Operating Agreements" (MOAs) in six of its facilities in the latter 1980s (Lovell, et aI, 1991 ).
Yet, even the Chrysler experience repeats that which Walton (1985) and others have well documented, namely that such experiments seem to have some staying power, but that they generally fail to spread to other units within the firm.
As such they become experimental islands in a sea of traditional practices.
Interestingly, the use of flexible work systems seems to be gaining faster acceptance among plant managers, local union leaders, and employees than among higher-level managers and national union leaders whose support will clearly be required for diffusion to take hold.
To cite one example, Digital Equipment Corporation recently announced that it planned to close the two plants in its organization that had, by its own account, gone further than any others in committing to and implementing flexible, team based work systems.
One of these was a greenfield site specifically designed (Fisher, 1991; Gordon, 1990; Hay Group, 1991; Kanter and Mirvis, 1989 ).
Here there is diffusion; alas, the direction is directly counter to the principles of mutual commitment. Some years ago we (Kochan and Dyer, 1976) Purcell (1989) has noted that the trend toward divisional or profit center (tlM-Formtl) organizational structures also serves as a constraint on the elevation of human resources to levels of strategic importance. In these structures human resource decisions tend to be decentralized to the divisional level.
AN ALTERNATIVE CHANGE MODEL AND SOME PROPOSITIONS
This reduces the likely effects of overall corporate value systems and policies, and increases the probability that decision horizons will be shortterm.
Two recent international studies reinforce the importance of developing models that extend beyond the boundaries of individual firms. Both Walton (1987) and Cole (1989) While we do not pretend to have a well developed and tested model in hand at this point, we offer the following as key propositions for testing in the interest of developing such a model:
Proposition 1. The capacity of any individual firm to initiate and sustain human resource innovations is constrained by the extent to which these innovations are similarly adapted by other firms in its product and labor markets and customer and supp~ier networks.
The nub of this proposition is that no firm can transform its human resource practices alone.
Human resource innovations are likely to suffer from what is called a "market failures" problem (Levine and Tyson, 1990) .
That is, while all firms and the macro economy would be better off if all firms invested in human resource innovations, any particular firm will fail to capture the benefits of such investments if others fail to follow suit. This is most Obviously, the reverse logic applies to customers.
In one study of auto suppliers, for example, Gillett (1992) found that the extent of innovations in internal management systems varied directly with the expectations of the firms' customers.
Change was quickest in coming and most far reaching among those supplying Japanese customers who not only demanded them, but also facilitated their implementation. It was slowest and least extensive among those supplying divisions of American firms that were themselves less committed to similar innovations.
While a number of leading firms are now demanding higher quality from their suppliers, or are being required to provide it to their customers, so far their reach has been rather limited and narrowly focused.
The general weakness of industry associations in the U.S., along with the reluctance of firms to intervene in the human resource and labor-management relations affairs of their suppliers and customers, suggests that this avenue of change will have perhaps an important but limited impact. This, however, is a promising avenue for empirical research. It will be interesting to see, for example, if the pressures on suppliers, and of customers, produces a sustained and broad commitment to total quality and whether this will carry over into areas of human resource management that face less direct, market-driven, across-firm pressure.
Proposition 2.
Top and line management commitment is a desirable, but unlikely and generally insufficient condition for transforming human resource practices.
Virtually every article written on human resource innovations contains the obligatory final paragraph asserting the necessity for top management support for successful implementation.
Yet, as previously noted, these managers are under many competing pressures from inside and outside the firm, and there is no reason to believe that employee and human resource considerations will tend to prevail in their strategic decision-making and day to day actions.
While some chief executives, particularly the founders of such two years and each time the manager turned over the process of change was noticeably slowed (Lovell, et aI, 1991 (Krafcik, 1988) .
The New united Motors Manufacturing Inc (RUMMI) facility jointly owned by General Motors and Toyota, but managed by the latter, has received the most attention because it achieved benchmark levels of productivity and quality with an American workforce and union and with less technological investment than exists in most American owned and managed plants in the u.s. The dominant lesson from this case is that there is much value in a holistic approach to human resource management that is integrated with the dominant production system and that emphasizes the mutual commitment principles previously noted (Shimada and MacDuff ie, 1986 ).
Indeed, the human resource approaches introduced in NUMMI and other Japanese firms represent fundamental changes that cut across all three levels of the framework introduced in Figure 1 If events fail to move in these directions, on the other hand, the voices of human resource managers and professionals in many firms are destined to remained buried deep within the managerial hierarchy pleading for, but only sporadically receiving, the support and commitment of their more powerful managerial brethren.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Obviously, this view requires a substantial investment in high quality research to identify promising human resource innovations and to evaluate their effects on organizational and individual outcomes of interest to multiple stakeholders. Presupposed is a broadened perspective of the relevant stakeholders to include not only top managers (and maybe stockholders), but also various types of employees, labor leaders, and purveyors of public policies.
Also presupposed is a multi-national --or global --view, as well as a corresponding willingness to learn from the lessons of other countries.
All this may represent a particularly radical departure for u.S. scholars. 
